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Maximal lotteries is an attractive randomized voting rule, first considered by Germaine Kreweras in 1965 and independently proposed by Peter C. Fishburn in 1984.

Please see Wikipedia, these presentations (Practical Voting Rules, Maximal Lotteries), or this bibliography for more information.

This website is provided by the Chair of Decision Sciences & Systems at Technical University of Munich. Contributors: Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt (responsible), René Romen, Alexander Schlenga (currently in charge), Dominik Spies, Christian Stricker.
For questions or feedback, please contact us at voting@dss.in.tum.de.

Press ? to show all keyboard shortcuts. See this database for some interesting technical voting examples.
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KeyCommand
pShow / Hide the preference profile
rRandomize the preference profile (Impartial Culture)
cRandomize without Condorcet winner
mShow / Hide majority matrix
wRandomize weights of majority matrix
eEnter / Leave edit mode of the majority matrix
oCompute an optimal profile for the majority matrix
sShow / Hide the settings for maximal lottery
tToggle the tie-breaking of maximal lotteries
fShow / Hide the additional Social Choice Functions
?Show / Hide this overview

Preferences of Voters over Alternatives

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Majority Matrix


Maximal Lottery


Settings

Other Rules

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Black Loading
MaxiMin Loading
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Plurality Loading
Plurality with Runoff Loading
Instant Runoff Loading
Anti-Plurality Loading
Bucklin Loading
Coombs Loading
Young Loading
 
Copeland Loading
Uncovered Set Loading
Essential Set Loading
Bipartisan Set Loading
Kemeny Loading
Schulze Loading
Ranked Pairs Loading
 
Condorcet Loading
Pareto Loading
Split Cycle Loading
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Urn process


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